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Abstract— Currently, most ISOs adopt offer cost minimization 
(OCM) auction mechanism which minimizes the total offer cost, 
and then, a settlement rule based on either locational marginal 
prices (LMPs) or market clearing price (MCP) is used to 
determine the payments to the committed units, which is not 
compatible with the auction mechanism because the minimized 
cost is different from the payment cost calculated by the settlement 
rule. This inconsistency can drastically increase the payment cost. 
On the other hand, payment cost minimization (PCM) auction 
mechanism eliminates this inconsistency; however, PCM problem 
is a nonlinear self-referring NP-hard problem which poses grand 
computational burden. In this paper, a mixed-integer nonlinear 
programing (MINLP) formulation of PCM problem are presented 
to address additional complexity of fast-growing penetration of 
Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) in the price-based market clearing 
problem, and a solution method based on the generalized benders 
decomposition (GBD) is then proposed to solve the V2G-integrated 
PCM problem, and its favorable performance in terms of 
convergence and computational efficiency is demonstrated using 
case studies. The proposed GBD-based method can handle scaled-
up models with the increased number of decision variables and 
constraints which facilitates the use of PCM mechanism in the 
market clearing of large-scale power systems. The impact of using 
V2G technologies on the OCM and PCM mechanisms in terms of 
MCPs and payments is also investigated, and by using numerical 
results, the performances of these two mechanisms are compared.  
 
Index Terms—Generalized benders decomposition, market 
clearing mechanism, uniform pricing, offer cost minimization, 
payment cost minimization, plug-in electric vehicle, vehicle to grid. 
NOMENCLATURE 
Parameters 
Bi(t) Single block bid price of unit i at time period t. 
Ci
NL No load cost of generating unit i. 
D(t) Total system load dema 
 
nd at time period t. 
Ev
min, Ev
max Minimum/maximum energy stored in batteries 
of PEV fleet v.  
NTi
 
Number of intervals of the stair-wise startup 
cost function of unit i. 
Pi
max(t), 
Pi
min(t)  
Maximum and minimum power offered by 
unit i at time period t. 
Pv
CH,max, 
Pv
CH,min  
Maximum/minimum charging capacity of PEV 
fleet v. 
Pv
DSCH,max, 
Pv
DSCH,min  
Maximum/minimum discharging capacity of 
PEV fleet v. 
RUi, RDi  Ramp up and ramp down rates for unit i. 
off
it
iSU  
Cost of the interval ti
 off
 (offline time) of the 
stair-wise startup cost function of unit i. 
SDi 
Shutdown cost of unit i. 
ti
 off
 Number of periods unit i has been offline prior 
to the startup  
T Number of periods of the time span. 
η
v
 Charging/discharging cycle efficiency of the 
PEV fleet v. 
λ, µ Lagrangian multipliers. 
Variables 
Ev(t) Available energy in batteries of fleet v at time t. 
MCP(t) MCP at time t. 
p
i
(t) Power output of unit i at time t. 
p
v
(t) Power output of PEV fleet v at time t. 
sci
u(t)
 
Startup cost of unit i at time t. 
sci
d(t)
 
Shutdown cost of unit i at time t. 
ui(t) Commitment status of unit i at time t. 
uv
CH(t), 
uv
DSCH(t) 
Charging/discharging status of PEV fleet v at 
time t. 
Set Indices 
i Index for generating units. 
t Index for study time interval. 
v Index for PEV fleets. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background and Motivation 
n electricity markets (e.g., the day-ahead markets), based on 
offers received from market participants (i.e., energy offers 
from producers and energy bids from consumers), independent 
system operators (ISOs) use a clearing algorithm to determine 
the market-clearing price, the power productions, and the 
consumption level of consumers in every period of time. 
Generally, there are two main clearing mechanisms: First, offer 
cost minimization (OCM) mechanism which is used to select 
offers in a way that the total bid cost is minimized, and second, 
payment cost minimization (PCM) which is used to select offers 
for minimizing total actual payments to the accepted bidders [1-
7]. After using clearing algorithm by ISO, in order to determine 
the payments to the selected bidders, a settlement rule (e.g., 
pay-as-bid pricing, uniform pricing) should be used [1-7]. In 
pay-as-bid pricing, since each accepted bidder is paid at its 
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offer, the payment cost is the same as the offer cost so that there 
is no difference between two auction mechanisms. However, 
when pay-as-market clearing price (MCP) or pay-as-locational 
marginal price (LMP) is utilized as the settlement rule, the 
payment cost would be different from the offer cost; therefore, 
PCM and OCM auctions may provide different clearing 
solutions which might result in different market equilibrium. 
Currently, the majority of market operators (e.g., NY-ISO, 
ISO-NE, ERCOT, PJM, MISO) adopt OCM auction 
mechanism in their markets. One of the justifications is that the 
OCM model is simpler to solve as compared to the PCM, and 
straightforward solution approaches have been developed to 
minimize the total production cost (including units’ offer costs 
and fixed costs) and maximize social welfare. Afterwards, pay-
as-MCP mechanism or pay-as-LMP mechanism is used as a 
settlement rule which is not compatible with the auction 
mechanism utilized because the minimized cost is different 
from the payment cost. This inconsistency between the clearing 
algorithm (i.e., OCM) and the settlement rule (i.e., pay-as-MCP 
or pay-as-LMP) can drastically increase the payment cost. By 
using PCM auction mechanism, this inconsistency is effectively 
eliminated, and considerable reduction in payments in 
comparison with payments of OCM mechanism is achieved [1-
10]. Literature has shown that for the same set of bids, PCM 
leads to reduce consumer payments. The market participants, 
however, may bid differently under the two auction 
mechanisms. In [11], the supplier’s strategic behaviors are 
investigated in a simplified day-ahead energy market under the 
two auctions, and it is concluded that PCM still leads to 
significant reductions in payments even with strategic bidding. 
In [12], it is shown that the sensitivities of LMPs with respect 
to the system uncertainties under the PCM mechanism are 
lower comparing to those under the OCM mechanism. This 
demonstrates yet another significant advantage of the PCM 
over the OCM mechanism.  
The PCM problem has recently received considerable 
attention due to the open challenges in both modeling and 
solution algorithm. The PCM problem is an NP-hard problem 
[3, 7]. Also because the market prices (either MCP or LMP) are 
present in the objective function, the PCM problem is a self-
referring optimization problem [12] and suffers from added 
complexity and computational burden. Therefore, inefficient 
solution algorithms may lead to prolonged computational time 
or even failure of convergence. To address these challenges, 
this paper presents an efficient solution algorithm based on the 
Generalized Benders Decomposition (GBD). 
B. Related Work on PCM 
The existing OCM auction in electricity markets is similar to 
the unit commitment problem in centralized market operations 
and solution methods for solving OCM auction abound. The 
solution methods for solving PCM problem, however, are 
limited and mostly inefficient [3, 4]. In [8], a solution method 
based on forward dynamic programming was presented to solve 
a simple PCM problem, but the author acknowledges that the 
method is not suited for large-scale problems ( due to “curse of 
dimensionality”). Reference [5] proposed a graph search 
algorithm to solve a simple PCM problem by assuming simple 
bids with price-quantity curve. But because of the complexity 
of the method, it is not suitable for solving large-scale problems 
either. In addition, the MCPs in this study are loosely defined 
as the maximum of amortized bid costs. In [13], the genetic 
algorithm was used to solve the PCM problem that also suffers 
from low computational efficiency. References [3, 7, 9] 
presented solution methods based on the augmented Lagrangian 
relaxation and surrogate optimization. But the proposed 
methods cannot guarantee solution feasibility [4]. In [10], a 
solution method based on bilevel programing was proposed and 
in [4], we presented a mixed-integer linear programming 
(MILP) formulation of PCM problem. The solution methods 
presented in [4] and [10] can merely be used to solve PCM 
problems with inelastic demands, but they cannot deal with the 
nonlinearities posed by energy storage systems, demand 
response (or elastic demand), and V2G. In this paper we extend 
the formulation presented in [4] to address this challenge, and 
solve the resultant mixed integer nonlinear programing 
(MINLP) formulation of PCM through GBD.  
It is observed that some studies in the literature [1-5, 8, 9] 
solved the PCM problem without considering the transmission 
constraints, while some others did [7, 10, 12]. Without loss of 
generality, transmission constraints are not considered in this 
study and the uniform price settlement mechanism based on 
MCP is used. As necessary, transmission constraints can be 
added to the model and the LMPs can be used as market 
clearing prices.  
C. Integration of V2G in PCM 
Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) as the portable source of 
electricity storages have undeniable benefits through intelligent 
charging and discharging scheme in a smart grid environment 
[14-20]. The techno-economic advantages of PEVs include 
flattening load curve and minimizing load curtailment by 
discharging PEVs in peak time and charging at off-peak 
periods, and providing frequency regulation and spinning 
reserves in fast response, etc. Due to the significant benefits, 
there is a pressing need to study market operations with a high 
level of V2G penetration. This paper has studied the impact of 
V2G on OCM and PCM in terms of both MCPs and payments 
for the first time.  
D. Main Contributions of This Work 
In our proposed GBD-based solution algorithm, the MINLP 
model formulation of PCM splits into 1) feasibility and 
optimality subproblems that are mixed integer linear 
programing (MILP) problems, and 2) a master problem which 
is a linear programing (LP) problem. The case studies and 
numerical comparison with other solution methods confirm the 
solution performance of the proposed solution algorithm, in 
terms of both computational convergence and speed. The 
proposed GBD-based method can handle scaled-up models 
with considerations for V2G, demand response (or elastic 
demand), and energy storage systems with the increased 
number of decision variables and constraints which facilitates 
the use of PCM mechanism in the market clearing of large-scale 
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power systems. Meanwhile, this work has modeled V2G in the 
PCM auction mechanisms for the first time. After analyzing the 
impacts on MCPs and payments, our study demonstrates further 
benefits of the PCM over the OCM mechanism with V2G 
integration. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
II presents the MINLP formulation of PCM-V2G problem; for 
comparison, the MILP formulation of the OCM-V2G problem 
is also described. Section III presents the GBD-based solution 
method for the PCM-V2G problem. Case studies and numerical 
results are illustrated in section IV where the benefits of V2G 
on both the PCM and OCM mechanisms are compared while 
the GBD-based algorithm solution performance is 
demonstrated. Finally, conclusions are presented in section V. 
II. OCM AND PCM FORMULATIONS 
In this section, the formulations of OCM and PCM auction 
mechanisms incorporating V2G are presented. It is assumed 
that system load demand is fixed and transmission constraints 
are not considered without loss of generality.  
A. The OCM-V2G Problem 
Generally, the objective function of the OCM-V2G problem 
is formulated as the minimization of the total production cost as 
follows: 
( )min ( ( ), ). ( ) ( )i i i i
t i
O p t t p t C t+  (1) 
where Oi(pi(t),t)  is the offer price function of unit i in terms of 
p
i
(t) at time period t, and Ci(t) represents the fixed costs 
associated with unit i at time t. By considering the typical single 
block offer curve, Oi(pi(t),t) in (1) as a generic function is 
replaced with Bi(t), and the objective function of OCM problem 
becomes: 
( )
1 1
min ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T I
u d NL
i i i i i i
t i
B t p t sc t sc t C u t
= =
 
 + + +  
 
  (2) 
where Bi(t) is a constant parameter for unit i at time t, and sci
u(t) 
and sci
d(t) are each the startup cost and shutdown cost variables 
associated with unit i, and Ci
NL  is the no load cost of unit i. The 
OCM-V2G problem is subject to the following constraints. 
 
a. Startup cost constraints: 
A typical exponential startup cost function in terms of offline 
time is shown in Fig. 1 by the dashed line. To model the 
problem as a MILP formulation, the stair-wise startup cost 
function (solid line in Fig.1) is modeled by using the 
following two constraints. 
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , 1,...,
off
i
off
i
t
tu off
i i i i i i
n
sc t SU t u t u t n i t t NT
=
 
 − −    = 
 
 
  (3) 
( ) 0 , ,uisc t i t    (4) 
where 
off
it
iSU is the startup cost of the interval ti
off
 of the stair-
wise startup cost function of unit i (Fig. 1). 
b. Shut down cost constraints: 
( )( ) ( 1) ( ) , ,di i i isc t SD u t u t i t  − −    (5) 
( ) 0 , ,disc t i t    (6) 
where constant parameter SDi is the shutdown cost of unit i.  
c. Power balance equation constraints: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,i v
i v
D t p t p t t= +    (7) 
where p
v
(t) is the output power of PEV fleet v at time t. 
Variable  p
v
(t)  is positive when the aggregated PEV fleet is 
discharging, and negative when the aggregated PEV fleet is 
charging. 
d. Constraints for the power output of generating units: 
min max( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,i i i i iP t u t p t P t u t i t       (8) 
e. Active power ramp constraints:  
max( ) ( 1) ( 1). [1 ( 1)] , ,i i i i i ip t p t u t RU u t P i t− −  − + − −     (9) 
max( 1) ( ) ( ). [1 ( )] , ,i i i i i ip t p t u t RD u t P i t− −  + −     (10) 
f. Constraints for charging and discharging power of the PEV 
fleets: 
max min( ) ( ) ( ) , ,DSCH DSCH, CH CH,v v v v vp t u t P u t P t v  −     (11) 
min max( ) ( ) ( ) , ,DSCH DSCH, CH CH,v v v v vp t u t P u t P t v  −     (12) 
( ) ( ) 1, ,CH DSCHv vu t u t t v+     (13) 
where uv
CH(t) and uv
DSCH(t) are binary variables representing 
the charging and discharging status of PEV fleet v at time t, 
respectively.  
g. The energy equation constraint of each PEV fleet: 
( ) ( 1) ( ), ,v v v vE t E t p t t v= − −     (14) 
where Ev(t) is the available energy in batteries of fleet v at 
time t and is calculated based the available energy at time (t-
1) and the hourly power output of PEV fleet v factored by the 
charging cycle efficiency of the PEV fleet v (η
v
). 
h. Constraints for energy capacity limits of the PEV fleets: 
min max( ) , ,v v vE E t E t v     (15) 
( ) ( ),v vE T T v=   (16) 
where Ev
min(t) and Ev
max(t) are minimum and maximum 
energy stored in batteries of PEV fleet v, and 𝜎𝑣(T) is the 
targeted energy level of PEV fleet v at the end of the study 
period. 
Other generator constraints can be also incorporated, such as 
minimum run time [21]. There are numerous solution methods 
Off-line time (h) 
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Fig. 1. Exponential and stair-wise startup cost functions. 
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for the OCM-V2G problem. In this study, the OCM problem as 
defined by (2)-(16) is solved as a MILP problem using a readily 
available commercial MILP solver such as CPLEX [22]. 
After clearing the market, most ISOs use pay-as-MCP or 
pay-as-LMP as the settlement rule. When transmission 
constraints are not considered, the uniform price settlement 
mechanism based on MCP is used. As a result, the MCP is 
defined as the highest offer accepted during each time period t. 
 ( ) max ( ( ), ) ( )i i iMCP t O P t t u t=   (17) 
The MCP as determined by (17) is merely used for energy 
payment; the committed generators can be paid separately to 
cover startup costs and shut down costs.  
B. The PCM-V2G Problem 
In the PCM-V2G problem without transmission constraints, 
a uniform market clearing price, i.e., MCP is being determined 
to clear the market. The objective function of the PCM problem 
directly minimizes the procurement cost and can be generally 
formulated as the following: 
( )min ( ) ( ) ( )i i
t i
MCP t p t C t +  (18) 
where Ci(t) represents the fixed costs associated with unit i at 
time t. In (18), MCP(t) is equal to the highest offer accepted by 
ISO. In the PCM-V2G problem formulation, MCP(t) is defined 
as a variable. With specific fixed cost, the objective function of 
PCM-V2G is presented as: 
( )min ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u d NLi i i i i
t i
MCP t p t sc t sc t C u t + + +   (19) 
The following constraint ensures that the value of MCP(t) is 
the maximum accepted offer among all generation offers Bi(t)  
[4]. 
( ) ( ) ( ) , ,i iMCP t B t u t i t     (20) 
Under constraint (20), continuous variables MCP(t) take on 
discrete values. The PCM-V2G problem is defined by objective 
function (19), and constraints (3)-(16), and (20). 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION METHOD USING GENERALIZED 
BENDERS DECOMPOSITION  
The nonlinearity of objective functions presented in (19) 
lines in the product of two variables in the first part of the 
objective function. This problem is a NP-hard problem; if the 
problem dimension becomes larger with more variables, 
solving the problem gets more difficult or even impossible, 
such as for a large-scale system with various DG sources. In 
this study, GBD [23] is utilized to split the problem into 
subproblems which are MILP problems, and master problem 
which is a LP problem. 
A. Formulation of the optimality subproblem 
To apply the GBD method to the problem, the decision 
variables are split into two groups X and Y. 
{ ( )}
{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}u d CH DSCHi i i i v v v v
Y MCP t
X p t u t sc t sc t p t u t u t E t
=
=
 (21) 
where Y is the set of complicating variables. Then, the objective 
function and constraints of PCM-V2G can be written as: 
( )
,
min ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u d NLi i i i i
x X y Y
t i
MCP t p t sc t sc t C u t
 
 + + +   (22) 
( ) ( ) ( )i iMCP t B t u t   (22-1) 
( ) 0g X   (22-2) 
where g(X)≤0  corresponds to the constraints (3)-(16). By fixing 
y
i
= ŷ
i
∈Y and for xiX, the optimality subproblem is formulated 
as: 
( )ˆmin ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u d NLi i i i i
x X
t i
MCP t p t sc t sc t C u t

 + + +   (23) 
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )i iMCP t B t u t                λi(t) (23-1) 
( ) 0g X                                  µ  (23-2) 
where λi(t) is the lagrangian multiplayer corresponding to 
constraint (23-1) for unit i at time period t, and µ is the vector 
of lagrangian multiplayer corresponding to constraint (23-2). 
Now, if optimality subproblem (23) is feasible, its optimal 
solution is denoted by X̂ with optimal multiplier vectors ̂ and 
̂. The solution of (23) provides an upper bound (UBD) for the 
solution of the main problem (22). 
ˆ
SubUBD Z=  (24) 
where UBD is the upper bound of the main problem (22) and 
?̂?sub is the optimal objective function value of the optimality 
subproblem (23).  
B. Formulation of the feasibility subproblem 
If the optimality subproblem (23) is infeasible, the feasibility 
subproblem is formulated as:  
( )
, ( )
min
i
i
x X t
t i
w t



=  (25) 
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i iMCP t t B t u t+               λi(t) (25-1) 
( ) 0g X                                           µ (25-2) 
where αi(t) is the slack variable corresponding to unit i at time 
t, and g(X)≤0  corresponds to constraints (3)-(16).  
C. Formulation of the master problem 
Each time the optimality or feasibility subproblem is solved, 
an optimality cut or a feasibility cut is generated and enforced 
for the following master problem:  
,
min
y Y 


 (26) 
s.t.  
Optimality cut: ˆˆ( , , )L Y    (26-1) 
Feasibility cut: ˆˆ( , , ) 0L Y     (26-2) 
with:  
( )( )
*
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( , , ) inf
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
u d
i i
i NL
t i t i i i
X
T
i i i
t i
sc t sc t
MCP t p t
C u tL Y
t B t u t MCP t g X
 
 
  + + 
 + +         =  
   − + 
  
  

 (26-3) 
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( )
*
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , , ) 1 inf
( )
i i i i
T
t i
X T
t B t u t MCP t t
L Y
g X
 
  

   − − +
 
= +  
  

 
 (26-4) 
where multipliers μ̂ and ̂  in (26-1) and (26-2) are iteratively 
provided from the solutions of optimality and feasibility 
subproblems. The explicit expressions of function L* presented 
in (26-3) can’t be easily obtained since variables x and y are not 
separable inside the infimum term which satisfy neither the P 
nor the P’ properties [24]. However, as often practiced in other 
engineering fields [24], the primal optimal solution ?̂? of the 
optimality subproblem is utilized in this study to approximate 
L*, and thus, the optimality cut (26-1) can be simplified as 
follows:  
( ), ˆ(t) ( )i t
t i
UBD MCP MCP t  + −  (27) 
where πi,t=λ̂i,t+p̂i(t)  in which πi,t , λ̂i,t ,and p̂i(t) are each the 
optimality multiplayer, optimal lagrangian multiplayer 
corresponding to (23-1), and optimal generation schedule of 
unit i at time t obtained from the optimality subproblem (23) for 
fixed y=ŷ. Likewise, feasibility cuts can be formulated for each 
time period 1≤ t ≤T as follows:  
( ),ˆ ˆˆ ( ) ( ) 0,t i t
i
w MCP t MCP t t+  −    (28) 
where ŵt= ∑ α̂i(t)i  in which α̂i(t)  is the slack variable 
corresponding to unit i at time period t achieved from the 
feasibility subproblem (25) for fixed y=ŷ=MĈP(t) . In (28), 
λ̂i,t is the optimal lagrangian multiplayer corresponding to (25-
1) obtained from the feasibility subproblem (25) for fixed 
y=ŷ=MĈP(t). The solution of the master problem (26) provides 
a lower bound (LBD) for the solution of main problem (22). 
ˆLBD =  (29) 
where ?̂? is the optimal objective function value of the master 
problem (26).  
D. Summary of the GBD-based solution algorithm 
The GBD-based solution algorithm is started using an 
initial guess y=ŷ=MĈP(t) . For example, the initial point can be 
the highest bid price of generation units, i.e., 
y
0
(t)=MĈP(t)= max
i
{Bi(t)}. As shown in [4], the solution of 
OCM problem can also be used as an initial value for the PCM 
problem. Then, optimality subproblem (23) is solved for the 
initial guess ŷ=y
0
, and UBD for the main problem (22) is 
obtained through (24), and an optimality cut for the master 
problem is constructed. If optimality subproblem (23) is 
infeasible, the feasibility subproblem (25) is solved and a 
feasibility cut for the master problem is constructed. After 
solving the subproblem, the master problem is solved with the 
new optimality or feasibility cut, and LBD for the main problem 
(22) is obtained through (29), and the updated solution ŷ=y
1
 for 
subproblems are achieved. The solution procedure continues, 
and optimality subproblem or feasibility subproblem is 
constructed with the updated solution ŷ=y
1
. The above iterative 
process continues until the UBD and LBD converge within a 
predefined tolerance threshold.  
IV. NUMERICAL CASE STUDIES 
In this study, a 24-hour problem with 10 generating units 
is considered. The system data, market offers, and hourly 
system load demands have been extracted from [21, 25]. In this 
case study, startup cost functions are modeled by a two interval 
stair wise linear function.  
int
int
offt i off i
i
i off i
HSC t T
SU
CSC t T
  
= 
 
 (27) 
where HSCi is the hot startup cost, and  CSCi is the cold startup 
cost of unit i; therefore, startup cost of first and second block of 
stair wise curve in Fig. 1 are equal to HSCi and CSCi , 
respectively. In fact, if offline time of unit i is lower than Ti
 int , 
the startup cost is equal to HSCi, and startup cost is equal to 
CSCi , otherwise.  
Also in this study, the 100000 PEVs are assumed for 
simulation. The probabilistic model of the attendance of PEVs 
in the PEV fleets for the hours of a day is extracted from [26], 
where the data is obtained from a parking lot from the city of 
Livermore, CA [27]. The maximum number of PEVs with 
charging/discharging status at each hour is presumed to be 10 
percent of total PEVs in PEV fleets. In addition, the following 
parameters are considered for each vehicle in the PEV fleets: 
battery capacity of each PEV is 15kWh, state of charge of each 
PEV is 50%, and charging/discharging cycle efficiency of each 
PEV is 85%.  
In model implementation, GAMS [28] with the CPLEX 
solver [22] is used to implement and solve both the OCM-V2G 
and the GBD-based PCM-V2G problems. The algorithm 
solutions are performed on desktop computers with Intel Core 
i3 CPU 530 @3 GHz and 3 GB RAM. 
For comparative analysis, the OCM and PCM problems are 
first solved as MIP problems without considering V2G. The 
load demand profile, MCP as well as the payment cost of both 
PCM and OCM as results of the solution are presented in Fig. 
2. As shown in Fig. 2, the PCM problem solves to lower MCPs 
and payment costs in the valley of the load profile, as compared 
to the OCM problem. Also as shown in Table I, the average 
MCP (62.792 $/MWh) and the total payment cost ($1816480) 
of the PCM problem are lower than those of the OCM (63.125 
$/MWh and $1823570, respectively). Therefore without the 
V2G, the PCM mechanism achieves a total saving of $7090 
(0.38%) over 24-hour study period as compared to the OCM 
mechanism.  
The case study is then examined with considering V2G in 
the system. To solve the PCM-V2G problem, the proposed 
GBD-based method is utilized to split the main problem, which 
is a self-referring and NP-hard problem, into MILP optimality 
and feasibility subproblems as well as LP master problem. 
Solver CPLEX is used to solve the resulted subproblems and 
master problem in each iteration. The solution algorithm starts 
with an initial guess for MCP(t). Based on the definition of 
MCP, MCP(t) is between the minimum and maximum bid price 
of generators. The initial value for MCP is assumed to be the 
highest bid price of generators (i.e., MCP0(t)=Max{Bi}=111 ). 
With the initial guess, the optimality subproblem (23) was 
solved, and then, the optimality cut was constructed and applied 
to the master problem. The master problem with the optimality 
cut was consequently solved to obtain new values for y (i.e., 
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MCP(t)). The second iteration starts with the new ?̂?1 which is 
achieved from the master problem. Optimality subproblem 
based on new ?̂?1 was infeasible; therefore, the feasibility 
subproblem was solved to create the first feasibility cut for the 
master problem. After 4 iterations, and after 2 feasibility cuts 
and 2 optimality cuts were applied to the master problem, 
solution convergence was achieved with the objective cost 
$1734015.125. The convergence of the GBD method has been 
presented in Fig. 3.  
The charging and discharging patterns of PEVs in OCM-
V2G and PCM-V2G have been illustrated in Fig. 4(a). As 
shown in Fig. 4(a), PEVs are charged at the off-peak of demand 
profile, and they are discharged at the peak of load profile. As 
illustrated in Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 2(c), without V2G, PCM has the 
lower MCP and payment cost compared to those in OCM 
mechanism in the valley of load profile. However, when V2G 
is utilized in the system, PCM has a better performance 
compared to OCM not merely in the valley of load profile, it 
has also a better performance in other time periods, as shown in 
Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c). It is because PCM mechanism uses the 
opportunity of charging and discharging PEVs to control and 
decrease MCPs and payment costs effectively. But, OCM 
mechanism uses charging and discharging PEVs to decrease the 
offer cost due to the objective function of OCM; therefore, 
because of the inconsistency between the clearing algorithm 
and the settlement rule, the MCP and payment cost in OCM-
V2G are much higher than those in PCM-V2G mechanism. As 
presented in Table I, the average MCP of PCM-V2G (60.417 
$/MWh), and also, the total payment cost of PCM-V2G 
($1734015.125) are lower than the average MCP of OCM-V2G 
(66.167 $/MWh) and the total payment cost of OCM-V2G 
($1888584.14), respectively. In fact, by using PCM instead of 
OCM in the system with V2G, $154569 is saved for this case 
study at the 24-hour period of time, and 8.18% saving is 
achieved. In summary, without V2G, PCM resulted in $7090 
(0.38%) saving for payments compared to the OCM 
mechanism; however, this amount significantly increased to 
$154569 (8.18%) when V2G is utilized. 
The curves of the net demand, MCP and the payment cost 
of OCM in the system with and without V2G are presented in 
Fig. 5. By using V2G in the system, in OCM mechanism, the 
offer cost is decreased from $1013048 to $993493.69; however, 
as shown in Fig. 5, MCP and payment cost have been increased 
due to the incompatibility between the clearing algorithm (i.e., 
OCM) and the settlement rule (i.e., pay-as-MCP). In fact, 
 
Fig. 2. Performance of PCM and OCM mechanisms in the system without V2G: (a) Load profile; (b) MCP; (c) Payment cost 
 
   
Fig. 4. Comparison of the performance of OCM and PCM mechanisms in the system with and without V2G: 
(a) Charging and discharging pattern of PEVs; (b) MCP; (c) Payment cost 
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Fig. 3. Convergence of the proposed GBD-based algorithm  
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TABLE I 
PAYMENT COST AND AVERAGE MCP FOR PCM AND OCM MECHANISMS  
WITH AND WITHOUT V2G 
 OCM OCM-V2G PCM PCM-V2G 
Total Payment  
Cost ($) 
1823570 1888584.14 1816480 1734015.125 
Average MCP 
($/MWh) 
63.125 66.167 62.792 60.417 
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because of the objective function of OCM, OCM mechanism 
uses charging and discharging PEVs to decrease the offer cost 
without regarding to the increase of the payment costs and 
MCPs. Therefore, MCPs and payment costs in OCM in the 
system with V2G have been increased in comparison with those 
in the system without V2G. 
The curves of the net demand, MCP and the payment cost 
of PCM in the system with and without V2G are presented in 
Fig. 6. As shown in Fig. 6, by using V2G in the system, the 
performance of PCM has been improved, and MCPs and 
payment costs have been decreased due to the compatibility 
between the clearing algorithm (i.e., PCM) and the settlement 
rule (i.e., pay-as-MCP). 
Payments to each unit for each OCM, OCM-V2G, PCM, 
and PCM-V2G problems are presented in Table II. As shown 
in Table II, in PCM mechanism, by using V2G in the system, 
unit 9 which had offered high price is not utilized, and payment 
cost decreases. In OCM mechanism, by using V2G, because of 
the goal of the OCM problem (i.e., minimizing offer cost), unit 
10 with lower startup cost and higher bid price is selected 
instead of unit 7 with higher startup cost and lower bid price to 
decrease the offer cost, and it is the reason why despite 
decreasing the offer cost in OCM-V2G, the payment cost has 
increased. 
To examine the performance of the proposed GBD-based 
method, the PCM-V2G problem was also solved by using two 
commercial solvers DICOPT [29], which is based on the 
extensions of the outer-approximation algorithm for the 
equality relaxation strategy, and SBB [30], which is based on a 
combination of the standard Branch and Bound method and 
some of the standard nonlinear programing software (NLP) 
solvers, as well as three free solvers SCIP [31], COUENNE 
[32], and BONMIN [33]. Table III demonstrates the effective 
performance of the proposed GBD-based solution method 
compared to MINLP solvers.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has proposed a GBD-based solution method to 
solve PCM problems which is able to handle the nonlinearity 
posed by the V2G integration. Furthermore, in this study, the 
performances of PCM and OCM auction mechanisms has been 
investigated in the system with and without V2G. The key 
finding in this paper are summarized as follows: 
 
1) By using V2G in OCM mechanism, the offer cost were 
slightly decreased; however, MCP and payment cost were 
increased which is because of the incompatibility between the 
clearing algorithm (i.e., OCM) and the settlement rule (i.e., pay-
as-MCP). But, by using V2G in the system, the performance of 
PCM were improved, and MCPs and payment costs were 
decreased due to the compatibility between the clearing 
algorithm (i.e., PCM) and the settlement rule (i.e., pay-as-
MCP). Based on the numerical results, without using V2G, 
PCM resulted in $7090 (0.38%) saving for payments compared 
to the OCM mechanism; however, this amount significantly 
increased to $154569 (8.18%) when V2G is utilized. In 
conclusion, in the system in which V2G is utilized, using the 
PCM mechanism can considerably decrease the payment costs 
and achieve a huge saving compared to OCM mechanism. 
2) It has been shown that the proposed GBD-based method is 
effective to solve the PCM problem which is a complex self-
referring and NP-hard problem. Since the proposed GBD-based 
method split the PCM-V2G problem into simple MILP 
subproblems and LP master problem, it can be utilized in large 
scale systems with the increased number of decision variables 
and constraints. In addition, since the proposed method is an 
iterative method, linear sensitivity coefficients (LSC) can be 
also used to cope with the nonlinearity posed by nonlinear 
network constraints (either in transmission or distribution 
systems) as explained more in [34, 35]. In conclusion, the 
proposed GBD-based method presented in this paper can pave 
the way for future research works on PCM auction mechanism. 
Future work may include nonlinear network constraints as well 
as the probabilistic characteristics of load variation, especially 
under the smart grid initiatives for demand response. 
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